This paper studies a market for secured loans to information-problematic borrowers. Competitive banks grant mortgages to liquidity-constrained households to …nance a …xed supply of homes. There are two contracting frictions: households privately observe their endowments, and they cannot commit to a contract.
Introduction
Common …nancing contracts feature fewer contingencies than risk sharing in frictionless markets would predict. In particular, households and small businesses typically enter into debt contracts with noncontingent repayment schedules and costly resolution of defaults. A vast literature, pioneered by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) , construes these arrangements as a consequence of ex post informational asymmetry. Namely, such contracts may be optimal if the lender incurs a cost to observe the realization of the pledged cash ‡ows, while the borrower does not. This paper studies the impact of ex post informational asymmetry on debt capacities and asset prices in a dynamic endowment economy. We develop an equilibrium framework for the analysis of secured lending to information-problematic borrowers who face severe liquidity constraints. Our goal is to o¤er an analytically tractable model that delivers realistic orders of magnitude for debt capacities, default intensities, and trading volume in subprime mortgage markets.
We study an economy in which banks competitively grant mortgages to households so as to …nance a …xed supply of homes. A mortgage is a claim to a household's future income and to the future market value of its home. Households are tightly contrained: their …nancing capacities in the mortgage market determine their home sizes. Two contracting frictions determine these …nancing capacities. First, households privately observe their incomes, and can secretly consume all or part of it before reporting the residual to a lender. Second, households cannot commit to a contract, and are free to terminate a contract in order to re-trade in mortgage and housing markets as they see …t. Banks can commit to eviction after payment default. The threat of eviction creates some incentives for households to repay. In equilibrium, a household honors payments as long as two conditions are met. First, its income must be su¢ ciently high that it can repay. Second, market conditions must be such that the household wants to repay instead of terminating the mortgage, vacating the home, and re-trading in mortgage and housing markets. Households' aggregate debt capacity drives the aggregate demand for homes. Home supply at a given date stems from foreclosures after default, sales motivated by the acquisition of a larger home, and sales that follow exogenous moving decisions. Market-clearing home prices in turn drive aggregate debt capacity.
The assumption of tightly constrained agents who exhaust their mortgage capacity is meant to describe a housing market in an area that is populated by many subprime borrowers, and/or is subject to strong supply constraints. Mian and Su… (2008) …nd evidence consistent with binding mortgage constraints in geographical areas with an important population of subprime borrowers. This assumption allows us to derive equilibrium loan-to-income ratios, home prices, default intensities, and trading volume in the mortgage market.
We obtain the following main results. First, systematic income risk has a negative impact on debt capacity because it implies that evictions are more likely to take place when home demand is low. This lowers the endogenous collateral value of homes, which in turn generates low current debt capacities and home prices. This result is di¤erent from one of …nancial ampli…cation in which a low collateral value of assets generates productive or allocative ine¢ ciencies (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 , or Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In our economy, agents do not create real externalities for each other through the balance-sheet channel. The competitive equilibrium is allocationally e¢ cient.
Second, if all else equal a larger fraction of individual income risk is idiosyncratic, then equilibrium debt capacities and home prices are not necessarily higher. The intuition is the following. If a larger fraction of total income risk is idiosyncratic, then the income of a particular household is less correlated with home prices. On one hand, this raises banks'proceeds from foreclosures. This mitigates the aforementioned problem of endogenous low liquidation values. On the other hand, diversi…cation of income risk also makes households'lack of commitment power more costly. Households with positive idiosyncratic income shocks have a low probability of default. But they eventually seek to move for exogenous reasons, or to climb up the property ladder since they moved up in the cross-section of incomes. As a result, they exit the contractual relationship when the net present value of continuation is the highest to the incumbent bank. Households'lack of commitment is less costly in the presence of more systematic income risk. In this case, a household which experiences positive income shocks competes in mortgage and housing markets with households with similarly high income realizations. Thus, termination is less valuable to the household, and less costly to its bank. Whether the net impact of diversi…cation of income risk on equilibrium debt capacities is positive or negative depends on the parameters.
In other words, we establish that in the presence of one-sided commitment, diversi…ability of borrowers'income risk does not necessarily ease collateralized lending. The larger ex post heterogeneity of borrowers is a double-edged sword. On one hand, the assets seized from unlucky borrowers can always be sold to luckier borrowers standing ready to snap them up. But the ‡ip side of these higher liquidation proceeds is that these same lucky borrowers receive more outside options in equilibrium. The exercise of these options also imposes more costs on lenders. The possible bene…ts from diversi…ca-tion of borrowers'risks on collateral liquidity have been well identi…ed in the literature on endogenous debt capacities (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) . That the costs induced by ex post heterogeneity may more than o¤set these bene…ts when borrowers' outside options are an equilibrium outcome is a novel …nding, to our knowledge.
We establish these …rst two results under the assumptions that the equilibrium price is linear in aggregate income, and that contractual mortgage repayments are constant. Our third result is that the linear equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in which home prices satisfy a transversality condition. We also show that some types of rational bubbles that can be sustained in unconstrained economies are no longer feasible equilibrium outcomes in the presence of noncontingent contracts. We show that "bubbly"equilibrium price paths imply equilibrium mortgage payments that are lower than with non-bubbly prices. Aggregate income shocks have a more persistent impact on defaults in the presence of a bubbly price path because equilibrium repayment-toincome ratios are countercyclical in this case.
Finally, we study contracts with more complex repayment schedules than the …xed-repayment ones used throughout the paper. We …nd that contracts with initial "teaser rates"that gradually increase are optimal for a plausible range of parameters. We also …nd that these contracts do not generate signi…cantly larger debt capacities than the simple …xed-repayment ones.
This paper relates to two strands of literature -the literature on endogenous incomplete markets and the literature on the microeconomics of housing markets. First, a large body of work seeks to endogenize market incompleteness with commitment problems (see, e.g., Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , Kehoe and Levine (2001) , and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2008) for recent contributions). Closer to our approach, Krueger and Uhlig (2005) introduce in this literature the feature that households'outside options after terminating a contract are competitively supplied by the …nancial sector -a key ingredient of our model. Although we have a more applied focus than these contributions, we share with them the broader goal of characterizing the equilibrium interaction between individual contracting problems and asset prices. We depart from these papers in that our primitive contracting friction is private information. This friction entails that contractual repayments are noncontingent, and that borrowers with bad outside options unwittingly default in equilibrium. Thus, our setup o¤ers a more realistic picture of actual debt markets than the ones in which borrowers default only voluntarily to exercise desirable outside options. Stein (1995) and Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) study the impact of credit constraints on prices and trading volume in housing markets. Both papers assume realistic but exogenous credit constraints, and write a detailed model of households' decision-making under such constraints. Our broad-brush approach is more stylized.
We abstract from important features of housing markets such as interest rate risk and the role of downpayments. However, constraints and contracts are equilibrium consequences of primitive frictions in our environment. Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008) study optimal mortgage design in the presence of ex post informational asymmetry. Our approach is complementary. Our optimal contracting problem is by construction much simpler than theirs, but the resulting tractability gains allow us to unveil interesting equilibrium e¤ects.
Finally, even though our focus is on the qualitative analysis of a stylized model, we obtain plausible orders of magnitude for equilibrium variables. This suggests that our setup is a promising workhorse for more quantitative future work on mortgage markets, along routes that we discuss in the conclusion.
Model
Time is continuous and is indexed by t 2 [0; +1). We …x a …ltered probability space ( ; F; P ). There is a single perishable consumption good which serves as the numéraire. There is a unit mass of assets -housing units. There are two types of agents: a unit mass of households and several non-atomistic banks.
Households
Households derive utility from occupying homes and consuming. They are myopic, and their objective is to maximize the sizes of the homes that they currently occupy. Myopia captures that subprime borrowers are typically agents with low …nancial-planning skills. Formally, the preferences of household j at date t are de…ned over bundles (q j;t ; n j;t ) 2 [0; +1) [0; +1) ; where q j;t is the number of housing units that it occupies between t and t + dt, and n j;t dt its consumption between t and t + dt.
Household j ranks such bundles as follows.
If q > q
0 , then household j strictly prefers (q; n) to (q 0 ; n 0 ) for all n; n 0 0.
2.
If n > n 0 , then household j strictly prefers (q; n) to (q; n 0 ) for all q 0.
In words, households prefer to occupy the largest possible home, and maximize consumption when indi¤erent. We are not wedded to these particular lexicographic preferences. Their sole role is to ensure that binding mortgage constraints determine the equilibrium outcome. Any set of myopic preferences such that mortgage constraints bind in equilibrium would yield equivalent results.
For all j 2 [0; 1], there exists a Poisson process N j;t with intensity > 0 such that at each jump date, household j vacates its current home, and re-enters the housing market for unmodelled reasons. These dates capture trades in the housing market that are not primarily driven by the evolution of the real estate market, but rather by occupational changes, changes in household size, etc. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to these dates as exogenous termination dates or ET dates.
Each household j 2 [0; 1] is endowed with an income stream (I j; t ) t 0 such that
The systematic component of income obeys
where W t is a standard Brownian motion 1 , 2 [0; 1], and > 0: We set I 0 = 1: Idiosyncratic income follows a geometric Brownian motion that is re-set at the ET dates. Formally, we denote @ j the set of jump dates of N j;t for all j 2 [0; 1], and
where W j;t is a standard Brownian motion. This exponential re-setting of idiosyncratic income processes implies that idiosyncratic incomes (i j; t ) j2[0;1] have a constant cross-sectional distribution. That exogenous termination decisions and re-setting of idiosyncratic incomes are contemporaneous simpli…es the analysis but is not crucial to our results.
All stochastic processes (W t ) t 0 ; (W j;t ) t 0 ; (N j;t ) t 0 are pairwise independent.We will apply the exact law of large numbers to this continuum of independent processes. As is well known, doing so in a mathematically correct fashion requires the construction of an extension of the product of the Lebesgue unit interval and the state space such that the continuum of random variables be measurable with respect to this extension. Sun and Zhang (2008) show the existence of such extensions in which the exact law of large numbers applies for any variety of distributions. For expositional simplicity, we will informally invoke the exact law of large numbers throughout without explicitly constructing such complex mathematical objects.
Banks
Banks care only for consumption. They are in…nitely lived, risk-neutral, and discount the future at the rate r > 0. Banks are not …nancially constrained. We assume that their aggregate endowment is always larger than households'aggregate debt ca-pacity.
Banks own an eviction technology. This means that a bank can transform an occupied home that it has …nanced into a vacant home. Eviction comes at a cost equal to a fraction of the home market value, where 2 (0; 1]. This captures the value loss implied by foreclosures.
Market for vacant homes
Vacant housing units are perfectly divisible. However, in order to modify its home size from q to q 0 6 = q, a household needs to move into q 0 new units. Households face moving costs. If a household moves into q new units at date t, only a fraction q 1+c of these units enters its date-t preferences. The switching cost c > 0 captures all the costs associated with moving, mortgage re…nancings, etc. If household j does not move at date t, its entire real estate q j;t enters its preferences.
Banks and households are home-price takers.
Contracts
Banks enter into individual …nancing contracts with households. There are two contracting frictions. First, households can secretly consume all or part of their income before reporting the residual. Second, households cannot commit to a contract, and are free to re-trade in housing and mortgage markets as they see …t after terminating a contractual relationship. Banks can commit to a contract with a household. However, if a bank o¤ers a strictly positive cash transfer to a household after the initial date of a contract, or trades its eviction rights with other banks, then this legally quali…es as terminating the contract and originating a new one. In this case, the household is entitled to auction o¤ the eviction rights attached to its place to new banks. In other words, banks are not allowed to o¤er loans that discriminate between new and existing customers.
We impose two restrictions on the space of feasible contracts. First, we restrict the analysis to contracts that are executable by a principal who observes only the income reports and the actions of the particular household involved in the contract. This allows us to focus on the most realistic case in which contractual repayments cannot be indexed on aggregate income. 2 Because of idiosyncratic income risk, the model is still interesting without this restriction. We discuss this alternative in Section 2:2:4. Contracts map a household's paths of income reports and actions into paths of contractual payments, trades, and eviction decisions. Our second restriction is to 2 One way to endogenize this restriction is to assume that contracts must be implemented by loan o¢ cers. Each loan o¢ cer can implement only one contract, and observes only the reports and actions of the household involved in this contract. This restriction will then be endogenous if it is su¢ ciently costly for banks to communicate the aggregate income process that they observe to each of their loan o¢ cers.
consider only eviction decisions that are a deterministic function of history. 3 Optimal contracts are simple in this environment. Contracts are exclusive. The household uses its entire initial loan to acquire vacant units that it occupies until the contract is terminated. The bank claims the entire income reported by the household until termination, and retains the rights to sell the home once it is vacant. The bank commits to evict the household if it does not repay its entire report, or if the report is below a contractual deterministic repayment.
To see why this contract is optimal, consider a deviation in which the bank writes a new and di¤erent covenant if the household reports an income strictly higher than the minimal repayment at some future date. In order to be incentive-compatible, this new covenant must be such that the household consumes strictly more, and/or occupies a strictly larger place than when it reports the minimal repayment, or terminates the contract. This requires either a strictly lower repayment, and/or additional lending. A strictly lower repayment without additional lending violates incentive-compatibility. Additional lending from the incumbent bank or any other bank entitles the household to auction o¤ the bank's eviction rights, and thus must has zero value to the incumbent bank. Thus such a deviation can only strictly decrease the initial loan size. In equilibrium, households initially report their whole income at the outset of a contract, and then report only the minimal contractual repayment until voluntary termination, an ET date, or eviction.
Competition for contracts
Banks simultaneously o¤er at each date contract menus that are homogeneous of degree 1 in reported income. That is, banks simultaneously quote at each date a loanto-income ratio l and an associated contract for a unit income, thereby committing to grant to a household who reports a current income I a loan L = l I r against future repayments that are also scaled by I. If several banks make competitive o¤ers, they obtain equal market shares.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of contract menus, home prices, and allocations for each date such that at each date:
1. A bank cannot make a strictly positive pro…t by o¤ering a di¤erent menu of contracts.
2. The market for vacant units clears.
3. Each household has an optimal housing and consumption allocation given its current contractual obligations (if any), contract menus, and home prices.
The fact that households exhaust their current borrowing capacity when they trade in mortgage and housing markets greatly simpli…es the analysis. Solving for explicit equilibrium contracts and prices in this general environment remains di¢ cult, however, for two reasons. First, contractual repayments cannot be made contingent on income, but can be made contingent on time, with possibly complex schedules. Second, the supply and demand of vacant homes at a given date depends on all past contracts and on the past re-allocations of homes between ex post heterogeneous households with time-varying borrowing capacities. Several sets of additional restrictions to this general model yield tractable and interesting situations. We study them in the balance of the paper. Sections 2 and 3 restrict the analysis to the case in which banks o¤er contracts with constant repayments. Section 2 studies equilibria in which prices are a linear function of aggregate income. Section 3 studies nonlinear prices. Section 4 discusses time-contingent repayment schemes. Section 5 concludes. Proofs with little economic content are relegated to an appendix in Section 6.
Constant Repayments and Linear Prices
This section solves for equilibria under the restrictions that banks o¤er contracts with constant repayments, and that prices are a linear function of aggregate income. Under the restriction to …xed-repayment contracts, a contract is characterized by a loan-toincome ratio and a repayment ratio 2 [0; 1] such that the contractual repayment o¤ered to a household reporting an income I is equal to I per unit of time for the duration of the contract. The contractual terms that a bank quotes at date t can, of course, depend on all the information available at t. We …rst solve for the polar cases in which = 0 and = 1, and compare the equilibrium debt capacities obtained in each case. We then tackle the case in which 2 (0; 1).
Non-Diversi…able Income Risk
This section solves the model in the simplest case in which = 1. Income processes are identical in this case. We assume that housing units are evenly distributed across households at the outset. This case is particularly simple because trades in the housing market follow only two motives: the occurence of an ET date and default. Absent crosssectional heterogeneity, there is no other reason for going on the market since there is no possibility to move along the property ladder. Proposition 1 characterizes the unique linear equilibrium.
There is a unique equilibrium with …xed-repayment contracts and linear home prices. The repayment o¤ered to household j at date t is I t , where the constant is the unique solution within [0; 1] of:
The price of a home unit is:
where +1 is also the loan-to-income ratio o¤ered in the loan market.
Proof. We need to solve for the loan-to-income ratio and for the repayment ratio that a bank chooses to o¤er at date t under the expectation that future home prices will satisfy 8u 0; P t+u = P I t+u (2.3)
for some constant P > 0. A loan taken by household j at date t is terminated at the random date t + T j;t ; where
The random variable T j;t is the …rst ET date occuring after t :
and T j;t denotes the time elapsed until the income of household j hits the value I j;t for the …rst time after t. Namely,
The random variables T j;t ; T j;t ; T j;t are stopping times adapted to (F t ) t 0 : Since their distributions do not depend on j and depend on t only through , we will omit the superscripts j; t on these variables in what follows. It is in the interest of a household to fully disclose its income I j;t = I t at the outset of a date-t contract in order to obtain the largest possible home. Thus, if a household j accepts the o¤er from a bank that quotes a repayment ratio at date t, the bank expects the future ‡ows from lending to household j to be equal to
rs I j;t ds + (1 ) 1 fT >T g e rT P t+T q j;t + 1 fT T g e rT P t+T q j;t ;
(2.4) where q j;t is the number of home units purchased by household j at date t: The …rst term on the right-hand side of (2.4) is the expected value of repayments before termination. The second term is the expected proceeds from a home sale net of eviction costs. The third term is the expected proceeds from selling an unoccupied home after an ET date.
Let t [0; 1] denote the subset of households who switch homes between t and t + dt. Let s t dt denote the measure of vacant homes supplied in the market between t and t + dt. Competitive o¤ers generate total expected repayments of
# (2.5) Both t and s t depend in a complex fashion on income history. That each household always trades one unit implies, however, that
Plugging the conjectured linear price (2.3) in (2.5) and applying Lemma 1 in Section 6:1 with = 1 and = 0; (2.5) becomes:
The equilibrium repayment ratio must maximize R t L j;t dj. The equilibrium loanto-income ratio yields zero pro…t to banks for such a . From (2.7) it is easy to see that the optimal is a constant such that
Clearing the market for vacant homes yields
Proposition 1 is then obtained by solving for P as a function of in (2.10) and plugging the expression in (2.8). That (2.1) has a unique solution over [0; 1] is easy to see with a monotonicity argument. Equation (2.2) shows that when banks quote a repayment ratio , they discount promised repayments I t at a rate r + r, where the equilibrium spread r is equal to
. It increases with respect to because default risk is increasing in . This increasing spread implies that the loan size as a function of has an inverted-U shape, and is maximal for the equilibrium value of de…ned by (2.1). The rising probability of default more than o¤sets the increase in promised repayments when increases beyond this equilibrium value. This is reminiscent of the model of credit rationing developed by Williamson (1987) . The spread corresponding to the equilibrium value of is equal to r . It increases with respect to r and and decreases with respect to but does not depend on eviction costs. The eviction costs have an adverse impact on the loan-to-income ratio through . Assuming away eviction costs is instructive. From expressions (2.1) and (2.2), tends to 1 when ! 0; so that
Thus, when foreclosures come at no cost, the repayment ratio tends to 1, but the equilibrium home price is still strictly smaller than it would be in the benchmark model without contracting frictions. Absent such frictions, households would pledge all their income and the price P t would be equal to . Instead, in this extreme case = 1; in which households do not have the possibility to move along the property ladder, trades in the housing market are either exogenous moving decisions or foreclosures. Because of the latter source of trades, the supply of vacant homes is large when demand is low. Negative realizations of systematic risk imply a large number of defaults and a small borrowing capacity for potential buyers. In other words, the price P t re ‡ects that trading volume is negatively correlated with aggregate income because of contracts' enforcement. 4 Of course, this e¤ect becomes marginal as ! +1; in which case ! +1: In this case most trades are for exogenous reasons, and supply and demand in the home market become therefore independent in the limit. Thus, the expected price of a given home, conditional on the home being sold, tends to the unconditional future market value of the home.
It is worthwhile noticing that the fact that banks do not internalize the impact of their choice of a repayment ratio on the value of collateral does not reduce their supply of funds. In other words, a social planner internalizing the impact of on home prices through P cannot impose a value of for which debt capacities or home prices are higher than in the competitive setting. 5 This is because our economy is always allocationally e¢ cient: households collectively occupy the …xed supply of homes, and banks make no pro…ts. This contrasts with models that mix …nancing constraints and investment decisions, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . In these models, systematic risk lowers debt capacities because lenders fail to internalize the negative balance-sheet externalities that they create for each other. This leads to suboptimal investment and possibly multiple equilibria. In our setup, systematic risk a¤ects prices through contracting frictions without distorting allocations. Endogenizing the quantity of homes could lead to …nancial ampli…cation in our setup as well.
Fully Diversi…able Income Risk
This section studies the polar case = 0 in which there is no aggregate income risk. We solve for a steady-state equilibrium in which the unit home price P is constant, and in which the supply of vacant homes and the income of households in the market between t and t + dt are Sdt and Idt respectively, where I and S are constant. Note that it must be that
If this equality was not satis…ed, then each household would get a quantity of homes q j di¤erent from its income i j when on the market:
which would imply that the total measure of homes would be di¤erent from aggregate income since all agents have been at least once in the market in the steady state. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 If banks quote a repayment ratio 2 [0; 1] then the home price is
The equilibrium repayment ratio is characterized by
Proof. In the presence of idiosyncratic income risk, there are three reasons why a household becomes active in the market for vacant homes: i) the occurence of an ET date, ii) default, iii) and because its current income hits (1 + c) times the income it had last time it was on the market. Formally, a loan taken by household j at date t is now terminated at the random date t + T; where
We already de…ned the variables T and T , and T c is de…ned as:
Assuming a given equilibrium repayment ratio , clearing the market for vacant homes yields:
That S = I implies that the equilibrium price is
The computations of Ee rT and E e rT 1 fT <Tc;T <T g that lead to expression (2.11) are relegated to the appendix in Section 6:2. Finally, that the competitive repayment ratio is the one that maximizes P stems from the same reasons of allocative e¢ ciency as in the case with systematic risk. Notice that, unlike when = 1, debt capacities tend to the …rst-best I j;t r when eviction costs become small ( ! 0 so that ! 1). Yet, as we show now, debt capacities are not necessarily higher when = 0 in general.
Comparing the cases = 0 and = 1
It is interesting to …rst compare loan-to-income ratios for = 0 and = 1 when switching costs c become large. 6 In this case, contracts are terminated for two reasons only -ET dates or default -for both values of . As c ! +1, the limiting value of (2.11) is lim c!+1
and the optimal repayment ratio -the one that maximizes P -is the root within (0; 1) of:
From (2.2), the loan-to-income ratio for a given repayment ratio if income risk is fully systematic is Proof. Let S and I denote the respective equilibrium repayment ratios when 6 A higher debt capacity is not desirable per se in this simple environment. We …nd it relevant to compare debt capacities because a greater ability to borrow would be Pareto improving in simple extensions of the model. For instance it would be the case if banks made pro…ts increasing in total lending, if housing supply was not inelastic, or if indivisibilities were restricting participation in the mortgage market. = 1 and = 0 respectively. If 0; then
The intuition for this result is the following. The expected proceeds from a loan are the sum of three components: i) the promised repayments until default or an exogenous move, (ii) sale proceeds net of eviction costs in case of default, (iii) proceeds from selling the vacant home if the household moves for exogenous reasons. Whether income risk is diversi…able or not has no impact on the value of component (i). That income risk is idiosyncratic implies that the income of a given household is uncorrelated with home market values at default and ET dates. This is good news for component (ii), which represents situations in which individual income has done poorly, but bad news for (iii) in which individual income has done rather well. As and increase, a larger fraction of total loan value stems from component (iii) rather than component (ii). Thus, diversi…cation has an adverse impact in this case. In sum, diversi…ability of income risk implies that the home price that a bank receives upon termination of a given mortgage is not tied to the income of the borrower at the date of termination. This is bene…cial to the bank when the borrower is unable to repay and is evicted because its income is low. This is detrimental to the bank when the borrower voluntarily exits the contract and its income is high.
Consistent with the one-sided commitment assumed here, households just vacate their current home when they seek to move. Thus, the bank's expected prepayment is the home market value, and this drives the negative impact of diversi…cation shown in Proposition 3. In practice, households have more commitment power. Upon moving, they typically sell their house to prepay their mortgage according to pre-agreed terms. We believe that this departure from our model cannot fundamentally reduce the negative impact of diversi…cation that we established. Banks can still not fully capture idiosyncratic income appreciation through high pre-agreed repayments. High repayments that exceed home values would create high incentives for strategic default, particularly so for non-recourse loans.
In the presence of a …nite switching cost c, it is no longer clear that equilibrium loan-to-income ratios are larger with = 0 than with = 1; even for values of and that satisfy (2.14). In this case, the costs of diversi…cation are more important because the cross-sectional mobility of incomes implies that good borrowers exercise their option to climb up the property ladder more often. Table 1 reports the values of c below which equilibrium debt capacity is lower when income risk is diversi…able than when it is systematic for di¤erent values of . The values of c below which diversi…able income risk yields lower debt capacities become quickly very high as increases. Thus the costs of diversi…cation become quickly as important as the bene…ts from higher collateral values. In sum, our setup of longterm contracting with one-sided commitment and informational asymmetry exhibits a trade-o¤ between two e¤ects of ex post heterogeneity. These e¤ects have been studied independently so far. We show that the ‡ip side of the gains from higher equilibrium liquidation values is a higher cost of the lack of borrowers'commitment.
Turnover in the Steady-State
With fully diversi…able income, we can simply characterize several other features of the economy. Unlike representative-agent models, our model explicitly predicts trading intensities motivated by default, renegotiation, or ET. This implies in turn that we can compute the supply of vacant homes Sdt, and the income of households in the market
Idt between t and t + dt. We have the following results.
Proposition 4
We have
where
The steady-state arrival intensity of households in the market is 1 p pc : The respective arrival intensities of households who default, renegotiate, and exogenously terminate the contract are
; and respectively.
Proof. The proofs of (2.15) and (2.16) are in Section 6:2 of the appendix. We compute I and S. Consider a household which is in the market at date t. The next time this household will be in the market will be when the …rst of the three following events occur: ET date, default, or renegotiation. By de…nition p and p c are the respective probabilities that the …rst of these events are default and renegotiation respectively. The income of a household which is in the market is reset to 1 if it is in the market because of an exogenous termination. If not, its income can be characterized with the two integers m and n -such that m + n > 0 -that count the respective numbers of times the household has defaulted and renegotiated since the last time its income was reset to 1: Its income is then equal to
Thus we have
Furthermore, let M dt denote the steady-state measure of households in the market between t and t + dt: A fraction 1 p p c of these households trade because of the realization an ET date. Since such dates occur with intensity ,
and the arrival intensity of households in the market M is 1 p pc : Thus the respective arrival intensities of households who default and renegotiate are This full characterization of trading patterns in mortgage and housing markets o¤ers insights on the equilibrium consequences of a decrease in c due to regulatory, technological, or competitive changes. As we will see shortly, a decrease in c implies lower debt capacities and lower repayment ratios , but yet more aggregate lending per unit of time because more households are in the market at each date. We will also show that a lower c implies a higher equilibrium default intensity because more households are close to their default boundary in the steady-state. It is interesting to relate this e¤ect to some patterns of the recent U.S. housing boom and subsequent subprime crisis. It is widely believed 7 that a heavy reliance on frequent re…nancing was an important characteristic of subprime mortgages, which were designed to create a strong incentive for households to re…nance. As a result, and as predicted by our model, as the total debt capacity of subprime borrowers increased, so did aggregate defaults. The change in defaults, however, occurred only with a lag since it takes time for households to hit the default boundary of a freshly re…nanced mortgage. Failure to have correctly anticipated this shift in defaults following a shock on c may contribute to explain the observed mis-pricing of many subprime-backed securities. An interesting route for future research is the study of the actual transition path from a steady-state with a high c to one with a low c.
Orders of magnitude
Our model with fully idiosyncratic income risk gives plausible broad orders of magnitude. Assume a (real) rate of 2%, a volatility of households' income of 20% (see Dynan et al., 2008) , ET dates that arrive with an intensity of 5% -corresponding to a contractual mortgage duration of 20 years, a relocation threshold 1 + c of 1:5, and = 15%. 8 This yields a steady-state with a repayment ratio of 50%, an arrival intensity in the market 1 p pc of 15%, and a default intensity of 2.3%. Fabozzi (2006) reports average front-end debt-to-income ratios of 40% for subprime borrowers, and back-end ratios averaging above 50%. 9 Considering our focus on subprime borrowers, and the fact that we do not explicitly model a …xed subsistence level of consumption, a 50% loan-to-income ratio is a reasonable …rst pass. The trading intensity of 15% corresponds to an e¤ective mortgage lifespan of 6.5 years, which is the correct order of magnitude for U.S. mortgages. 10 Finally, the default intensity of 2.3% is in line with the rate of mortgage delinquencies for borrowers with low FICO scores observed by Keys et al. (2006) until 2006. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the loan-to-income ratio as a function of and
.
[ Figure 1 About Here] Debt capacity is not too sensitive to for low values of . Conversely, as the cost at which households climb the property ladder decreases ( close to 1), the commitment problem becomes quickly very costly and hurts debt capacity. Interestingly, unlike in the fully systematic case, an increase in the ET intensity actually reduces debt capacity provided and are small. We provide an intuition for this result in the next section. The high impact of on debt capacity stems from the fact that renegotiation intensity soars as c becomes smaller than 30%: Figure 2 shows the equilibrium value of the steady-state default intensity and when is small. It is so despite the fact that the repayment ratio decreases w.r.t.
and for such small values of . The intuition is the following. If is large, the dominant e¤ect of an increase in is that it "completes contracts", and reduces the needs for enforcement through evictions. When all else equal is small, the dominant e¤ect of an increase in or is a negative equilibrium e¤ect on the distribution of households'solvency. As increases, since households enter new contracts and thus maximize their debt capacity more often, there is a higher fraction of households closer to their default boundary in the steady-state. Otherwise stated, the dominant e¤ect in this case is that an increase of or reduces the steady-state fraction of households that are very safe borrowers. To see this, Figure 3 illustrates how the steady-state density of I j;t+s I j;t I j;t I j;t ; (2.17)
where t is the date at which the loan was originated, varies as a function of for = 0.
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[ Figure 3 About Here] Figure 3 shows the density for values of (2.17) ranging from 0 (default) to 25%. This con…rms that the dominant impact of an increase in for and small is an increase in the number of risky borrowers. Figure 4 illustrates the income I of households in the market.
[ Figure 4 About Here]
The income of households in the market re ‡ects the weights of each motive to trade. For small and , lots of trades follow from foreclosures and thus there is a large majority of households whose income has done poorly in the market. Conversely, I becomes nearly 20% higher than unconditional income as the fraction of households which trade to climb up the property ladder rises. Finally, Figure 5 shows that the total loans granted between t and t + dt, equal to P I dt, increase with and .
[ Figure 5 About Here]
No Contractual Restrictions
As already mentioned, the assumption that mortgages cannot be indexed on aggregate income seems more realistic. Absent this restriction, the general case in which 2 (0; 1) is a straightforward application of the case in which income is fully diversi…able. The only di¤erence is that contractual repayments and prices are multiplied by the systematic component of income.
General Income Risk
The general case in which 2 (0; 1) is not analytically tractable because, unlike when 2 f0; 1g ; demand and supply of vacant homes depend in complex and di¤erent fashions on the history of aggregate income risk. Essentially, the distribution of idiosyncratic incomes of households who are in the market is no longer stationary as it was in the two polar cases that we studied. In particular the key property S = I that holds when 2 f0; 1g no longer does. It is possible, however, to solve for prices and loan-to-income ratios in a modi…ed version of the model in which the distribution of income is improper. Formally, we modify our baseline model as follows: Assumption 1. Idiosyncratic income is not re-set at ET dates. Thus, the income process of household j 2 [0; 1] is simply I j; t = I t i j; t ; dI t I t = dW t ; di j; t i j; t = q 1 2 dW j; t ;
and again all processes are pairwise independent.
Assumption 2. Idiosyncratic log-incomes (ln i j;0 ) j2[0;1] have an improper uniform distribution over the real line. Also, i j;0 = q j;0 for all j 2 [0; 1] at t = 0.
For expositional simplicity we present the case without voluntary renegotiation (c = +1).
This setup clearly has the unpalatable property that aggregate supply and demand do not exist absent a proper income distribution. However, there still exists a unit price of the form P t = P I t and a loan-to-income ratio such that banks maximize expected proceeds per loan and each household makes optimal housing and consumption decisions. When interpreting the results, one has to keep in mind, however, that changes in the parameters would have additional complex e¤ects in a model with a proper income distribution, unless this distribution is extremely di¤use. We have the following result:
There is a unique ( ; P ) 2 (0; 1) (0; +1) such that if banks believe that home prices are P t = P I t , then banks maximize expected proceeds by quoting a repayment ratio , households make optimal housing and consumption decisions, and beliefs are correct. Banks quote the repayment ratio which solves:
and the price of a home is:
Proof. Assume that banks believe that home prices satisfy 8u 0; P t+u = P I t+u for some constant P > 0. Again, a loan taken by household j at date t with contractual repayment I j;t is terminated at the random date t + T j;t ; where
with:
and
Let t denote the subset of households who switch homes between t and t + dt. If a bank quotes an equilibrium repayment ratio and unit loan L then the expected repayments from household j 2 t are In the baseline model with proper income distributions, R t dj and R t i j;t q j;t dj are di¢ cult to characterize because past realizations of aggregate income risk drive the current home supply and the distribution of income in the market in di¤erent fashions, except when 2 f0; 1g. Under the simplifying assumption of an improper distribution, i j;t = q j;t for all j 2 t , and
Applying Lemma 1 with = 0 to compute the right-hand-side of (2.18) yields the proposition.
Note that the loan-to-income ratio obtained in Proposition 5 tends to the values of the baseline model when tends to 0 or 1: This is because the improper distribution buys us a property of stationary distribution of idiosyncratic incomes in the market that holds in the baseline model only for = 0 and = 1: Note also in passing that the loan-to-income ratio depends on only through . Since the denominator of the loan-to-income ratio is 1 , the sign of drives the impact of diversi…cation as already seen in Proposition 3. Figure 6 shows the respective impact of and on loan size.
[ Figure 6 About Here]
Perhaps most surprising is the impact of on loan size. First, for all values of , the loan size tends to the …rst best
as ! +1. This is because arbitrarily frequent ET dates "complete contracts" by ensuring that repayments are re-set very often at current income levels. Note that convergence is quite slow, however, because discrete re-settings of contracts closely track the di¤usive part of income only when done at very high frequencies. Second, the equilibrium loan size decreases (increases) with respect to for small values of when is small (large). The intuition for this result is related to the one behind Proposition 3. An increase in has two positive e¤ects and a negative one:
1. The …rst positive e¤ect is a reduction in expected eviction costs.
2. The second positive e¤ect is that it increases the fraction of home sales that do not occur when the common component of incomes is low.
3. The negative e¤ect is that a home is sold for exogenous reasons only if the household has not defaulted before the ET date. This implies that the conditional distribution of its income at an ET date is skewed to the right. Conditional skewness becomes more signi…cant as decreases. This conditional skewness implies that sales on ET dates occur when outstanding loans are highly valuable to the bank.
The second positive e¤ect plays an important role only in the presence of systematic risk. Conversely, the third negative e¤ect is more important absent systematic risk because in this case the resale price of a home has no reason to be particularly high when the idiosyncratic income of the household is high. Thus trading a very safe loan for the market price of vacant home at an ET date is a bad deal. This is why the e¤ect of an increase in can be negative when most income risk is idiosyncratic and is low.
Nonlinear Prices
This section studies equilibria in which the price is not a linear function of aggregate income. To …x ideas and ease the exposition, we study the simplest model of Section 2:1 in which all income risk is systematic ( = 1). Results similar to the ones that we establish in this case hold in the other cases studied in Section 2. Consider the benchmark of a frictionless economy in which households'income is fully pledgeable. Such a model is equivalent to an in…nite-horizon economy in which risk-neutral agents price a claim to a consumption ‡ow (I t ) t 0 . In this case, the price P t = It r is the only equilibrium price that satis…es the transversality condition E t e rs P t+s = 0:
Absent this transversality condition, it is well-known that there can be "bubbly"equilibrium price paths as long as the aggregate endowment grows su¢ ciently quickly. We examine the counterparts of these results in our environment with contracting frictions. We …rst establish that the linear equilibrium price derived in Proposition 1 is the only equilibrium price that satis…es the transversality condition.
Proposition 6
The only equilibrium in which the price process satis…es (3.1) is the one described in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Section 6:3 in the Appendix. Thus, contracting frictions do not modify the property of the unconstrained economy that the linear equilibrium is the only one without exploding price paths. We now investigate which type of bubbly equilibria can be sustained. We …rst look for simple deterministic bubbles of the form
where (P; B; b) 2 R 3 + . We have the following result.
Proposition 7 Equilibria in which the price is of the form (3.2) are such that B = 0:
Proof. We introduce the variable s = r b and stress the dependence of the coef…cient on r with the notation (r) = . Let denote the equilibrium repayment ratio. With a price of the form (3.2), the market-clearing condition in the linear case (2.10) becomes
This is a straightforward consequence from Lemma 1 and equation (6.11) . Note that the right-hand side of (3.3) is …nite only for b < r + . An equilibrium price with B > 0 requires that is such that 4) and also that maximizes the right-hand side of (3.3) taking all other parameters …xed. It is easy to see that such a cannot exist: solutions to equation (3.4) do not depend on I t while a that maximizes the right-hand side of (3.3) does.
If income was fully pledgeable, a constant bubble could grow at the rate b = r absent a transversality condition. Contracting frictions prevent such bubbles to be sustainable equilibrium outcomes. In the presence of a bubble, unlike in the linear case, each bank chooses a repayment ratio that depends on current income level I t . With such repayment ratios, the equilibrium price cannot be of the form (3.2) in this case. It is possible to show similarly that bubbles that burst with a …xed intensity à la Blanchard and Watson (1982) cannot be sustained in this environment.
That the repayment ratio chosen by banks depends on I t in the presence of a bubble suggests to look at a class of bubbly price paths of the form
(3.5)
where P = 1 1 +1 r , and F : R + ! R + is di¤erentiable: The following proposition characterizes equilibria with a price of the form (3.5).
Proposition 8
If an equilibrium features a repayment ratio (depending on I t ) and a price of the form (3.5), then for all I t
(3.6) and
Proof. See Section 6:4 of the appendix. Equation (3.6) is the market-clearing condition. Equation (3.7) is the …rst-order condition associated with the banks' choice of an optimal . In an unconstrained economy with Brownian dividends similar to our income process, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) exhibit an interesting bubbly price path of the form F (I t ) = CI t with > 1. Again, such "intrinsic" bubbles do not correspond to equilibrium price paths in our model with contracting frictions. 12 We do not know whether there exists or not a function F (I) di¤erent from zero and a repayment ratio (I) that solve the system of functional equations (3.6) and (3.7) . Notwithstanding this open question, it is interesting to study the characteristics of such hypothetical equilibria. They display relationship between home price paths and contracting terms that are reminiscent of what has been recently observed in subprime markets. Consider the simple case in which the total value of a home is lost in the foreclosure process ( = 1): We have the following result:
Proposition 9
Consider a positive function F ( ) and an associated repayment ratio F (:) that satisfy (3.6) and (3.7) for = 1. Then 1. If F 6 = 0; then F (I) < 0 for all I > 0, where 0 is the (constant) equilibrium repayment ratio in the linear equilibrium in which F = 0. Furthermore, 0 is an accumulation point of F (I) as I ! +1, and +1 is an accumulation point of the loan-to-income ratio as I ! +1.
If F (I) is increasing and 1, or if
is increasing, then F (:) decreases from 0 to 0 as I t increases from 0 to +1: Proof. 1. Assume = 1 and let
for a candidate solution F . Equation (3.7) is then
The left-hand side of (3.8) is the derivative with respect to of the loan-to-income ratio
+1 that would prevail were the equilibrium linear. The numerator is a decreasing function of with one zero. Thus, in the presence of a bubble, it must be that the repayments are smaller than the ones that are optimal with a linear price in order to 12 To see this, note that with F (I t ) = CI t ; equation (3.6) implies that an equilibrium should be a constant, while it is easy to see from (3.7) that must depend nontrivially on I 1 t : satisfy (3.8). If F 6 = 0, then (I) cannot be bounded. Otherwise it would imply that the price satis…es the transversality condition. From (3.8), this implies that 0 must be an accumulation point of F ( ) in +1: Also, the loan-to-income ratio
To establish that if F ( ) is increasing and 1, then the repayment ratio F (I t ) is decreasing from 0 to 0 when I t goes from zero to in…nity, it su¢ ces to notice that the right-hand side of (3.8) increases w.r.t. F (I t ) for F ( ) increasing and 1. To see this, note that
That this result also holds when ( ) is increasing is established similarly. Thus, the self-justi…ed belief that the price path is explosive implies that banks set lower repayment ratios despite quoting larger loan-to-income ratios. The intuition is that defaults become quite costly in the presence of a bubble because they limit banks' ability to ride it. Future home value is a more important component of the loan than the current borrower's ability to repay. Time-variations in repayment ratios amplify the sensitivity of default intensities to income paths in the bubbly case (if such a case exists) compared with the linear equilibrium. After a negative shock on I t , not only do some borrowers default on their current loans, but newly issued loans also feature higher repayment ratios and thus lower distances to default. This will generate more future defaults after a lag. The impact of income shocks on default intensities is therefore more persistent with bubbly equilibria than in the linear one.
Nonlinear dynamics are generated by the procyclicality of loan-to-income ratios that become very large when income is high. Almeida et al. (2006) and Lamont and Stein (1999) …nd evidence of such an ampli…cation through procyclical leverage in housing markets.
Towards Optimal Contracts
We restricted the analysis to contracts with constant repayments for tractability. This section studies the impact of this restriction by allowing for repayment schedules that depend on time elapsed since the origination of the loan. The goal is to show that equilibrium quantities do not di¤er signi…cantly from the ones derived with constant repayments. We focus on the case in which income risk is diversi…able ( = 0) and all trades correspond to exogenous terminations or foreclosures (c = +1) for expositional simplicity. The optimal repayment schedule is a continuous function of the time elapsed since origination g( ) such that if the contract has been originated at date t; then the t + s contractual repayment is e g(s) . We have the following compact characterization of the optimal contract.
Proposition 10 Let
the optimal contractg ( ) solves
Proof. See Section 6:5 in the appendix. Problem (4.1) does not seem to be analytically solvable. Solving it numerically is also challenging. 13 We take the …rst steps in this direction by studying the equilibrium when the contract space is expanded to contracts with repayments that are log-linear, and log-linear with one kink. We …rst solve for the equilibrium price with log-linear contracts.
Proposition 11 Assume that at date t, banks quote loans such that household j 2 [0; 1] promises to repay I j;t e 2 at each future date t + , with ( ; ) 2 [0; 1] R. The price of a home and the loan-to-income ratio are equal to
Proof. See Section 6:6 in the appendix. Writing down the …rst-order conditions for the equilibrium ( ; ) -equivalently, the ones that maximize P -is not very informative. Figure 7 compares optimal repayment schedules in the cases in which repayments are constant, log-linear, and piecewise loglinear with one kink. 14 [ Figure 7 About Here]
It is interesting to notice that for these parameter values, repayment ratios become optimally larger than 1 in the long run even though the income process has no drift and there is no in ‡ation risk in our environment. 15 The log-linear contract features increasing repayments. So does the one with a kink after a short series of high and then decreasing initial repayments that can be interpreted as an initial downpayment. These repayment patterns are reminiscent of the "teaser rates" that often apply in practice. Such schedules are optimal because households'expected income at remote dates conditionally on still honoring repayments increases over time. Figure 8 illustrates equilibrium loan-to-income ratios with these three types of contracts as a function of :
[ Figure 8 About Here]
As becomes small, the …xed-repayment contract does quite poorly. This is because suboptimal repayment schedules become more costly when contracting relationships become longer-lived,. For around 5%, loan-to-income ratios increase by less than 5% when adding a drift, and less than 1% by allowing for a kink. This suggests that the restriction to …xed-repayment contracts is not a critical driver of our …ndings.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed an analytically tractable model of secured lending to tightly constrained borrowers in which contracting frictions drive equilibrium default and re…nanc-ing intensities, debt capacities, and asset prices. In light of the current U.S. housing crisis, the model generates interesting insights into the impact of lower re…nancing costs and housing bubbles on these equilibrium outcomes. There are at least two interesting routes for future research. First, our model can be estimated in principle, and its rich set of predictions can be tested using household-level data. A number of our simplifying assumptions can be relaxed for the purpose of estimation. For example, we have assumed that households always exhaust their debt capacities, which results in a uniform repayment ratio for all households. We could specify instead indirect aggregate household preferences by using a distribution of repayment ratios observed in the data, or any other distribution. Similarly, we could allow for heterogeneity in re…nancing costs and in idiosyncratic income volatility.
Second, our framework is a versatile description of an economy with borrowing constraints that could be useful in contexts other than housing markets. It could be applied to study the behavior of other information-problematic borrowers, such as small businesses and entrepreneurs.
Appendix

Lemma 1
This section states and proves Lemma 1 that we apply throughout. Assume that a household j 2 [0; 1] accepts a loan at date t that speci…es a repayment of I j;t e 2 at each future date t + , with ( ; ) 2 (0; 1) R. Assume that the household does not renegotiate on its loan (c = +1). The loan contract is thus terminated at the random date t + T j;t ; where
and T j;t is de…ned as
The random variables T j;t ; T j;t ; T j;t are stopping times for (F t ) t 0 : Since their distributions do not depend on when and to whom the loan was granted, we will omit the superscripts j; t on these variables in what follows. We have the following result:
E t e rT 1 fT T g I t+T = 1 r + I t : (6.3)
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof invokes a number of auxiliary results that we state and prove in the next subsection for expositional clarity.
Proof of (6.1). Denoting '( ) the density of T , we have
Using (6.11), we obtain
Proof of (6.2). Denoting ' ( ) the density of T , we have Therefore, using (6.10) we arrive at
Proof of (6.3). Let us introduce the family of stopping times (T ; ) 0 = (min(T ; )) 0 : We have
Notice that
is a standard Brownian motion under the measure Q de…ned in (6.14). By (6.13) and (6.15) we have Using (6.10) we have
By Fubini's theorem
(6.9)
Proof of auxiliary results
Auxiliary result 1. The density of T is
Proof. See, e.g., Borodin and Salminen (2002) . Auxiliary result 2. Let X be a random variable independent from T taking values in [0; +1) [ f+1g whose density has Laplace transform L( ). De…ne T min = min(X; T ). Then the Laplace transform of the density of T min is given by
Proof. Straightforward computations. Auxiliary result 3. The Laplace transform of the density of T is
2 ) is actually well-de…ned for all 2 R: In particular, l'Hôpital's rule yields : (6.14)
We have:
: (6.15)
Proof. Note …rst that
From Girsanov theorem, viewed from date t
Therefore, 
Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that the equilibrium price (P t ) t 0 is a positive process that satis…es the transversality condition (3.1). Let denote the equilibrium repayment ratio. T , independent from (T; T ; T ). Clearly, iterating further and applying the transversality condition yields that the price must be linear with respect to I t . Moreover, Proposition 1 establishes that there is a unique linear equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof of Equation (3.6) . A price of the form (3.5) clears the market in the presence of such loan contracts if and only if:
F (I t ) = E t 1 fT T g e rT F (I t+T ) + 1 fT <T g e rT F (I t+T ) :
A straightforward modi…cation of (6.6) yields:
E t 1 fT <T g e rT F (I t+T ) = F ( I t )E t 1 fT <T g e rT = F ( I t ) : (6.22)
Next, we compute E t 1 fT T g e rT F (I t+T ) : A straightforward modi…cation of (6.8)
yields: Proof of Equation (3.7). A repayment ratio maximizes the right-hand side of (3.6) and thus expected loan repayments if and only if The …rst-order condition associated with this maximization problem is (3.7).
Proof of Proposition 10
Clearing the market for vacant homes in the presence of such contracts yields: Solving for P yields the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 11
With the same notations as in the previous sections, clearing the market for vacant homes in the presence of such contracts yields:
e rs ds + (1 ) P E t e rT 1 fT >T g + P E t e rT 1 fT T g :
Applying Lemma 1 with = 0 gives the values of the right-hand side expectations, and solving for P yields the Proposition. Figure 1 . Loan-to-income ratio for r=2%, σ=20%, and λ=15%. . Loan-to-income ratio for r=2%, σ=20%, and λ=15%. Figure 7 . Optimal repayment schedules for r=2%, σ=20%, δ=5%, and λ=15%. Figure 8 . Loan-to-income ratio for optimal fixed, log-linear, and piecewise loglinear repayment schedules for r=2%, σ=20%, and λ=15% as a function of δ.
